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Between democratic deliberation  






It is widely acknowledged that Jürgen Habermas is an advocate of a deliberative model of 
democracy.1 In essence, Habermas’s discourse ethics constitutes a systematic attempt to 
locate the normative grounds of deliberative democracy in the rational foundations of 
language. From a Habermasian point of view, every time we engage in the co-existential 
exercise of seeking mutual understanding (Verständigung), we anticipate that we are capable 
of reaching agreements (Einverständnisse). Put differently, our communicative ability to 
understand one another equips us with the deliberative capacity to reach agreements with 
one another. Thus, the emancipatory potential of communicative action manifests itself not 
only in our ‘weak’ orientation towards intelligibility (Verständlichkeit) but also in our 
‘strong’ orientation towards consensus-formation (Konsensbildung). Language use, 
irrespective of its quasi-transcendental features, is embedded in the pragmatics of interaction. 
Symbolic forms emerge in relation to spatio-temporally contingent modes of existence, 
whose political constitution is reflected in the socio-ontological significance of discursively 
motivated practices, which are vital to the construction of democracy. This chapter aims to 
demonstrate that Habermas’s concern with democracy is inseparably linked to his interest 
in language. More specifically, it seeks to illustrate that the following ten elements are 
central to Habermas’s multifaceted account of democracy: (1) deliberation, (2) reciprocity, 
(3) self-determination, (4) citizenship, (5) the state, (6) sovereignty, (7) communicative 
rationality, (8) regulation, (9) will-formation and (10) constitutional law. The chapter 
concludes by addressing a number of issues that arise when confronted with the task of 
assessing both the validity and the usefulness of Habermas’s communication-theoretic 
account of democracy. 
 
1. Democracy and deliberation 
One of the most fundamental features of democracy is that it allows human beings to engage 
in processes of deliberation. Acts of collective deliberation are processes of intersubjective 




arrangements shaped by potentially empowering dynamics of action co-ordination. To 
deliberate, then, means to reflect, to ponder and to contemplate. More specifically, to 
deliberate with others obliges us to navigate our way through situations of purposeful 
interaction that require context-sensitive frameworks of communication. If, following 
Habermas, we ‘shift the burden of justifying the effectiveness of practical reason from the 
mentality of citizens to the deliberative forms of politics’ (Habermas, 1998b, p. 386, italics 
added), we move the weight of substantiating the anthropological distinctiveness of 
communicative reason from the cognitive capacity of the subject to the recognitive potential 
built into experiences of intersubjectivity. Democratic decision-making processes can never 
be based solely on the self-referential motivations of isolated individuals; rather, they are 
founded on the mutually dependent wills of interconnected actors. One of the main objectives 
of deliberative forms of democracy is to give a rationally grounded voice to members of a 
particular community, whose capacity to develop a sense of solidarity constitutes a 
precondition for guaranteeing the relative stability of symbolically mediated and relationally 
constructed realities. 
Democratic modes of social organisation cannot dispense with rationally determined 
processes of collective deliberation. Only insofar as we deliberate collectively over the 
purposive organisation and normative habitualisation of society can we ensure that the 
course of history is guided by the transperspectival force of shared responsibility. In this 
sense, the ‘linguistic turn’2 in the social sciences, which is motivated by the rejection of the 
atomistic presuppositions underlying traditional philosophies of consciousness and the 
defence of the intersubjectivist assumptions underpinning post-metaphysical sociologies of 
language,3 is homological to the ‘deliberative turn’ in social reality, which is characterised 
by a shift from an arbitrarily ruled collective entity to a discursively constituted order, whose 
key institutions enjoy a considerable degree of legitimacy in terms of their capacity to 
regulate behavioural and ideological reference points shared by members of a given 
community (cf. Susen, 2010c, pp. 110–111, 116–117; cf. also Susen, 2014b). If, following 
Habermas, ‘a discursive or deliberative model replaces the contract model’ (Habermas, 
1994, p. 137, italics added) and if, as a result, ‘the legal community constitutes itself not by 
way of a social contract but on the basis of a discursively achieved agreement’ (Habermas, 
1994, p. 137, italics added), then the normative cornerstone of a democratically organised 
society  is  not  simply  its  formal  commitment  to  producing   and   protecting   
judicially confined social relations but, rather, its substantive capacity to enhance its 
members’ active participation in collective processes of consensus-oriented deliberation.4 
 
2. Democracy and reciprocity 
A further central feature of democracy is that it permits human beings to build social 
relations based on reciprocity. Indeed, systems of democracy depend on relations of 
reciprocity; that is, we can shape the development of society democratically only insofar as 
we co-ordinate our actions reciprocally. The whole point of democracy is to do justice to the 
fact that human existence is a condition of discursive reciprocity: not only do we need to 
reciprocate each other’s socially embedded actions, but we also need to reciprocate each 
other’s linguistically articulated reflections, in order to provide society with the solidity of a 
collectively sustained, communicatively structured and rationally justified background of 
normativity for the daily construction of reality. The overall stability of society is contingent 
upon its capacity to incorporate, and to respond to, the demands of its members’ 






Our quotidian quest for symbolically mediated modes of validity is indicative of the 
meaning-laden nature of society. Our constant exchange of linguistically uttered claims to 
validity illustrates that even large-scale systems of political representation hinge upon 
small-scale spheres of communicative deliberation. Thus, ‘the reciprocity of raising and 
responding to validity claims’ (Habermas, 2005, p. 384, italics added) is maintained by an 
intersubjectively constituted process derived from the co-existential necessity of articulating 
and exchanging legitimacy claims: the validity of collectively co-ordinated actions depends 
on the normative power they obtain through mutually established codes of legitimacy.5 
Democracy, then, is inconceivable without reciprocity because of the interdependence of 
individual and collective freedom: ‘the individual liberties of the subjects of private law and 
the public autonomy of enfranchised citizens reciprocally make each other possible’ 
(Habermas, 1994, p. 141, italics added; cf. Susen, 2009b, pp. 104–105). Just as the 
discursively motivated reciprocity between subjects is crucial to the functioning of 
democratic processes of collective deliberation, the confluence of autonomy and solidarity 
is central to successful bonding processes generating empowering dynamics of social 
integration.6 
 
3. Democracy and self-determination 
Another significant feature of democracy is that, due to its capacity to foster social relations 
based on mutual understanding and agreement, it allows for the emergence of both individual 
and collective forms of self-determination. Individual self-determination and collective 
self-determination are two complementary moments in the human striving for autonomy: 
the self-determination of individuals is pointless if not granted by collectives, just as the 
self-determination of collectives is worthless if not supported by individuals.7 
Following Habermas,  there  are  four  conditions  for  subjects’ free association within a 
democratic framework: 
 
a. the consolidation of an effective political apparatus, 
b. the formation of a more or less clearly defined ‘self’, 
c. the construction of a citizenry, and 
d. the creation of an economic and social milieu. 
(see Habermas, 2003, pp. 88–89) 
 
In other words, genuine forms of democracy need to draw on various political, cultural, 
institutional and economic resources of a given society to claim that they have the legitimate 
power to affirm their bonding function within the domain of a territorially circumscribed 
reality. 
To the extent that ‘[t]he identity requirement for the determination of a collective subject 
capable of self-determination and self-direction is fulfilled by the sovereign territorial state 
of classical international law’ (ibidem, p. 89),8 the right to both individual and collective 
autonomy is inscribed in the agenda of democratically organised societies. In essence, the 
right to self-determination and self-direction designates the legitimate capacity to define 
what one does and where one goes – individually or collectively. If subjects are granted the 
right to self-determine their actions, they are entitled to fill the space of historical 
indeterminacy with the self-empowering force of autonomy.9 
According to Habermas’s account of autonomy, however, the right to both individual 





are actively and directly involved in discursive processes of opinion- and will-formation. 
For assertions of self-determination are embedded in processes of communication. In this 
sense, self-government rests upon both communicative power and political power. 
‘Communicative power is the power that emerges from the exercise of political autonomy, 
and hence cannot be separated from the discursive processes of will-formation, i.e., from 
democracy’ (Preuss, 1998, p. 331, italics added). And political power is the power that 
emerges from the exercise of communicative freedom, and thus cannot be divorced from the 
linguistic processes of social integration, that is, from everyday intersubjectivity. Democracy 
and self-determination, then, are intimately intertwined because our ability to shape the 
course of history through communicative processes of critical intersubjectivity is indivisible 
from our capacity to develop a sense of individual and social responsibility by mobilising 
our species-constitutive resources10 through which we, as human beings, acquire a sense of 
both personal and collective sovereignty.11 
 
4. Democracy and citizenship 
A further key component of democracy in modern society is its dependence on different 
forms of citizenship. According to universalist conceptions of citizenship, civil, political 
and social rights constitute integral elements of modern democracies.12 According to 
differentialist conceptions of citizenship, numerous rights – that is, not only civil, political 
and social rights, but also several other rights, such as cultural, sexual and human rights – 
represent vital ingredients of late modern democracies.13 
The historical significance of civil, political and social rights manifests itself in the 
existence of three institutions that are central to the functioning of modern society: the law 
courts, the parliament and the welfare system (see Turner, 1994 [1990], p. 202; see also 
Turner, 2009, p. 68). The present-day relevance of the struggle over further – for instance, 
cultural, sexual and human – rights is illustrated in the commitment of an increasing number 
of modern democracies to protecting their citizens from both hidden and overt mechanisms 
of social discrimination. In the modern world, the pursuit of democracy cannot be 
disconnected from ‘the struggle for, and attainment of, citizenship’14 – the ideal of democratic 
freedom cannot be realised without a commitment to the construction of democratic citizenry 
(cf. Habermas, 2003, p. 88). 
It is far from uncontroversial, however, what the main elements of a democratic citizenry 
are and to what extent complex forms of society require complex forms of citizenship (see 
Susen, 2010b). Notwithstanding the issue of addressing the multiple challenges posed by 
high levels of societal complexity, it is hard to deny that the genealogy of large-scale 
systems of democracy is inconceivable without the establishment of differentiated models 
of citizenry. 
When reflecting upon the relationship between democracy and citizenship in the 
contemporary context, we need to face up to three historical processes, which – from a 
sociological perspective – are of paramount importance: (a) the consolidation of the 
neoliberal project, (b) the emergence of a post-communist world and (c) the rise of 
multicultural politics (see ibidem, pp. 260–262). 
 
a. If, under the neoliberal model, citizenship has been converted into a privatised affair of an 
increasingly commodified society, the question remains to what extent modern democratic 
systems have the capacity to undermine, rather than to reinforce, the detrimental effects of 






b. If, in the post-communist context, citizenship has been transformed into a universalised 
affair of an ever more globalised society, the question remains to what extent modern 
democratic systems have the capacity to cope with both the intra-national demands ‘from 
below’ and the supra-national pressures ‘from above’ in a world characterised by an 
intensified degree of interdependence of local and global developments.16 
c. If, following multicultural agendas, citizenship has been turned into a hybridised affair of 
a culturally fragmented society, the question remains to what extent modern democratic 
systems have the capacity to translate the presence of advanced levels of cultural 
complexity into an empowering resource, rather than a disempowering obstacle, in the 
pursuit of social stability, economic prosperity and developmental elasticity.17 
 
In  short,  the  increasing  differentiation  of  society  has  led to the complexification of the 
dynamic relationship between democracy and citizenship.18 
 
5. Democracy and the state 
One of the most controversial issues in contemporary social and political theory is the 
question of the extent to which democracy and the state constitute two irreducible components 
of modern society. More precisely, the question in this regard concerns the degree to which 
democracy and the state can be considered two interdependent foundations of highly 
advanced civilisational formations. From a historical point of view, it appears that the creation 
of modern democracies is inextricably linked to the consolidation of legitimate states. If there 
is a predominant – and, indeed, appropriate – consensus according to which, the ideal of 
democracy in the modern world can be realised only through the construction of a legitimate 
political state, then another controversial question arises, namely the following: What should 
such a state look like, in terms of both its ideological outlook and its institutional set-up? 
From a Weberian perspective, ‘the sovereign territorial state’ constitutes a cornerstone of 
modern societies (Habermas, 2003, p. 89, italics in original). From a Habermasian standpoint, 
the ‘sovereign Rechtsstaat’ represents an indispensable source of political legitimacy in 
modern democracies (see, for example, Habermas, 1996 [1992]-a). Both interpretations 
illustrate that, in a world characterised by the ubiquity of large-scale bureaucratic 
organisations, it is difficult – or, perhaps, implausible – to examine the concepts of 
‘democracy’ and ‘the state’ in isolation from one another. To the degree that the question of 
‘democracy’ and the question of ‘the polity’ are intimately intertwined, it is impossible to 
dissociate the possibility of collective deliberation from the necessity of political 
organisation. Just as we need to accept that a ‘distinctive feature of the modern state is the 
possession of the monopoly of the means of violence within a given territory’ (Hirst & 
Thompson, 1995, p. 410, italics added), we need to recognise that a predominant feature of 
modern democracy is the possession of the monopoly of the means of political discourse 
within a given society (cf. Susen, 2010c, pp. 110–111, 116–117). The territorial integrity of 
the modern polity is a precondition for the legitimate affirmation of the state’s institutionally 
established sovereignty, and the pluralistic elasticity of modern democracy is a prerequisite 
for the legitimate consolidation of the state’s discursively negotiated autonomy.19 
 
6. Democracy and sovereignty 
Another key issue arising from debates around the constitution of democracy is its relation 





a. The legitimacy of democracy depends on its capacity to protect and to promote the 
individual sovereignty of the members of a given society. At this level, democracy 
is aimed at converting the philosophical ideal of personal autonomy into a social 
reality based on individual responsibility and accountability (Mündigkeit) (see 
Habermas, 1987 [1965/1968], p. 311; see also Susen, 2007, pp. 37, 40, 69, 72, 82, 251). 
According to the early Habermas,  we  – as a species capable of cognition and action 
– possess knowledge-constitutive interests, which manifest themselves in our ability to 
control, to comprehend and to critique particular aspects of reality by generating, and 
making use of, technological, hermeneutic and critical forms of knowledge (see esp. 
Habermas, 1987 [1965/1968]). According to the late Habermas, we – as a species 
capable of speech and action – possess language-constitutive interests, which permeate 
our ability to represent, to regulate and to relate to particular aspects of reality by raising 
assertive, normative and expressive validity claims.20 Owing to the socio-ontological 
significance of our species-constitutive interests, we are obliged to recognise that the 
pursuit of individual and collective forms of sovereignty (Eigenständigkeit) is built into 
the nature of human linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit). 
Our ‘emancipatory cognitive interest’ (Habermas, 1987 [1965/1968], pp. 310, 314, 
italics added) in personal and social liberation from ‘dependence on hypostatized 
powers’ (ibidem, pp. 310, 313) enables us to pursue our ‘human interest in autonomy 
and responsibility (Mündigkeit)’ (ibidem, p. 311). Our linguistic capacity to question the 
unquestioned and to discuss the undiscussed permits us to follow our human interest in 
acquiring an empowering degree of individual sovereignty by immersing ourselves in 
discursively mediated forms of critical intersubjectivity. In other words, the emancipatory 
value of democracy – in the Habermasian sense – depends on its capacity to defend both 
the right and the will to individual sovereignty, which is indispensable to both the 
construction of personal autonomy and the development of a sense of responsibility (cf. 
Susen, 2009a, 2015b). Put differently, democracy – understood in Habermasian terms 
– is inconceivable without the emergence of linguistically anchored and discursively 
cultivated modes of sovereignty. 
b. The legitimacy of democracy depends on its capacity to protect and to promote the 
collective sovereignty enjoyed by the members of a given society. In the modern 
world, collective sovereignty is typically associated with national sovereignty, that 
is, the sovereignty of nation-states. In essence, two key levels underlying collective 
sovereignty can be distinguished: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. 
Whereas internal sovereignty stems from a political body’s capacity to claim 
legitimacy in relation to a particular society, external sovereignty is reflected in a 
political body’s capacity to claim legitimacy in relation to other political bodies. The 
former enables a given government to assume the supreme command over civil society 
by virtue of both de jure – that is, legal – and de facto – that is, coercive – institutionalised 
means. The latter, by contrast, is derived from nation-states’ mutual recognition of their 
respective territorial integrity and political legitimacy. Put differently, collective 
sovereignty is consolidated and sustained on the basis of both internal and external 
sovereignty. Hence, rather than presuming that the capacity for sovereignty simply 
emanates ‘from within’, we need to acknowledge the fact that ‘to a significant degree 
the capacity for sovereignty came from without’ (Hirst & Thompson, 1995, p. 410, 








If, therefore, we accept that the seemingly endogenous power of sovereignty is 
inextricably linked to its exogenous conditioning, we are compelled to concede that 
democracy is never simply a local or national affair, but always, at least in principle, 
also a global and transnational matter. Internally, democracy can work only insofar as 
the members of a given society are willing to engage in discursive forms of communicative 
intersubjectivity oriented towards collective deliberation. Externally, democracy can 
work only insofar as different polities are prepared to commit to transnational co- 
operation and transcultural dialogue, both of which are central to generating fruitful 
communication processes between different societies. 
 
In brief, democracy and sovereignty are two elements necessary for the construction of a 
society that is shaped by discursively constituted and morally valuable modes of agency.21 
 
7. Democracy and communicative rationality 
Democracy, in the Habermasian sense, has another crucial ingredient: communicative 
rationality. Indeed, Habermas’s plea for an ethics founded on communicative rationality can 
be conceived of as a proposition for a set of principles oriented towards deliberative 
democracy. The paradigmatic primacy ascribed to the construction of a discursively 
configured reality is motivated by the conviction that, as linguistic beings able to raise 
rationally justifiable validity claims, we can mobilise the empowering resource of 
communicative rationality to determine both the constitution and the evolution of society. 
In order to make sense of the discursive nature of democracy, we need to reflect upon 
five – interrelated – dimensions of communicative rationality.22 
a. Communicative rationality is based on Verstand (reason): as such, it is derived from our 
rational capacity to attribute meaning to the world by virtue of linguistically articulated 
claims to validity. 
b. Communicative rationality enables us to engage in processes of Verständigung 
(communication): as such, it permits us not only to co-ordinate our actions, but also to 
attribute meaning to them by virtue of intersubjective practices oriented towards mutual 
understanding. 
c. Communicative rationality is the main driving force guiding our species-constitutive 
search for Verstehen (understanding): as such, it allows us to imbue the givenness of 
reality with the meaning-ladenness of language and thereby to permeate the facticity of 
worldly objectivity with the normativity of lifeworldly intersubjectivity. 
d. Communicative rationality is both a means and an end of our orientation towards 
Verständlichkeit (intelligibility): as such, its existence is symptomatic of the fact that, as 
subjects capable of speech and action, we make sense of the world by making sense of 
each other. 
e. Communicative rationality is the principal socio-ontological force behind our ability to 
reach an Einverständnis (agreement): as such, its presence demonstrates that we – as a 
communicative species – are capable of mutual understanding and that we – as a discursive 
species – are capable of reaching agreements. 
This is the point at which democracy comes into play. Democracy rests upon the empowering 
potential of communicative rationality, because the symbolically mediated and intelligibly 
structured co-ordination of our actions within the sphere of reality lies at the heart of every 






a. Democracy is inconceivable without Verstand: in democratic societies, the ultimate 
resource of justification is not faith but reason. 
b. Democracy is unthinkable without Verständigung: in democratic societies, the ultimate 
resource of argumentation is not monologue but dialogue. 
c. Democracy is impossible without Verstehen: in democratic societies, the ultimate resource 
of signification is not the acceptance of facticity but the struggle over normativity. 
d. Democracy is unimaginable without Verständlichkeit: in democratic societies, the ultimate 
resource of action co-ordination is not egotistic self-referentiality but mutual intelligibility. 
e. Democracy is unimaginable without Einverständnis: in democratic societies, the ultimate 
resource of both small-scale and large-scale organisation is not violence but the search for 
agreements, including – if necessary – the agreement to disagree. 
 
In short, deliberative democracy and communicative rationality are two mutually inclusive 
conditions for the understanding-oriented co-existence of interdependent subjects.23 
 
8. Democracy and regulation 
It would be overly optimistic to suggest that the running of democracy is driven by 
exclusively empowering – notably, deliberative, communicative and discursive – forces. In 
fact, one of the less obvious dimensions of democracy is its regulative function (see 
Habermas, 1994, p. 138), which may be perceived as ambivalent in that it contains both 
positive and negative aspects: 
 
 On the positive side, the regulative function of democracy is illustrated in the fact that  
its existence allows for the establishment of relatively predictable – and, thus, fairly 
stable – forms of both small-scale and large-scale social interaction. 
 On the negative side, the regulative function of democracy is reflected in the fact that 
its existence can trigger inconveniently rigid – and, hence, excessively synchronised – 
forms of both small-scale and large-scale social interaction. 
 
If ‘morality and law both serve to regulate interpersonal conflicts’ (ibidem, p. 138) and if 
‘both are supposed to protect the autonomy of all participants and affected persons equally’ 
(ibidem, p. 138), a key function of democracy consists in organising human life forms in 
terms of both micro-sociological concerns, arising from people’s tangible experiences of 
Gemeinschaft, and macro-sociological issues, emerging from people’s intangible experiences 
of Gesellschaft. The validity claims of moral commands raised in the lifeworld (see ibidem, 
p. 139) and the legitimacy claims of legal norms imposed upon ordinary actors by the system 
(see ibidem, p. 139) form a dual regulative totality that permeates the praxeological horizon 
of every modern democracy. 
Democracy, then, is not only a ‘legislative practice of justification’ (ibidem, p. 139), but 
also a regulative process of normalisation. Just as ‘different types of reason’ (ibidem, p. 139) 
can be brought forward to make a case for a particular kind of legislation, different collective 
strategies can be employed to shape the development of a given society by specific patterns 
of regulation. Indeed, what manifests itself in the functional interdependence of legislative 
practices of justification and regulative practices of normalisation is the intertwinement of 
validity and normativity: rationally justified claims to validity that are aimed at equipping a 
collective entity with a framework of legislative regularity express a demand for normativity, 






In this sense, ‘law has a more complex structure than morality’ (ibidem, p. 139): 
whereas the latter serves to regulate people’s interactions in the concrete realm of 
Gemeinschaft, the former operates as a legislative umbrella that stipulates people’s 
interactions in the abstract realm of Gesellschaft. The distinctive power of democracy, in 
this context, is its capacity to make both ordinary claims to moral validity and institutional 
claims to judicial legitimacy subject to critical scrutiny by virtue of communicative 
rationality. In a democratic society, understood in the Habermasian sense, it is not the 
forceful force of symbolic or physical violence but, on the contrary, the forceless force of 
the better argument which gives validity to moral patterns of justification as well as 
legitimacy to legislative patterns of normalisation.24 In short, an important function of 
democracy is to guarantee the regulation of society – not by relying upon arbitrary forms 
of authority, but by drawing upon communicative rationality. Hermeneutically equipped 
entities capable of speech and action can determine the course of history by mobilising the 
discursive resources inherent in linguistically mediated practices of intersubjectivity.25 
 
9. Democracy and will-formation 
The construction of democracy is inextricably linked to the formation of both individual and 
collective wills. Put differently, democratic power is expressed in will power. Yet, democratic 
and non-democratic modes of will-formation are fundamentally different in the following 
sense: 
 
 In the former, every member of society has the right to express their opinion and, 
consequently, to participate in both private and public debates. 
 In the latter, some members or groups of society may be excluded from collective 
decision-making processes on relatively arbitrary – for example, economic, 
ideological, religious, cultural, ethnic, ‘racial’ or gender-specific – grounds. 
 
The universal right to be directly and actively involved in collective processes of will- 
formation, then, is a sine qua non of genuine articulations of democracy – notwithstanding 
the question of whether they are supposed to operate as models of deliberative or 
representative participation. Collective processes of democratic will-formation, however, 
are far from straightforward and can be successful only to the extent that people are able to 
question – that is, both to recognise and to relativise – the perspectival determinacy of their 
claims to discursive validity. 
 
Thus the opinion- and will-formation of the democratic legislature depends upon a 
complicated network of discourses and bargaining – and not simply on moral discourses. 
And unlike the clearly focused normative validity claim of moral commands, the 
legitimacy claim of legal norms – like the legislative practice of justification itself – is 
supported by different types of reason. 
(Habermas, 1994, p. 139, italics added) 
 
In other words, what we, as critical theorists of democracy, need to examine are the 
sociological implications of the fact that collective will-formation – as a process based on 
discursive negotiation and consensus-oriented communication – constitutes a normative 
challenge that requires actors who participate in practices of argumentation to transcend the 






communicative intersubjectivity. Different people with different backgrounds, standards, 
principles and convictions will mobilise different types of reason to describe, to analyse, to 
interpret, to explain and to assess different kinds of situation. The world of reason cannot be 
dissociated from the realm of experience. The manifold ways in which communicative 
actors make rational judgements are inevitably shaped by the normative standards to which 
they are exposed, and by the socio-culturally specific horizons in which they are embedded, 
when experiencing both the material and the symbolic dimensions of their lifeworlds. 
Collective will-formation is always a matter of social life-formation: what we want and how 
we decide is contingent upon what we have learned to want and how we have learned to 
decide. Our discursive problematisation of the world cannot be separated from our 
assimilative, adaptive and purposive immersion in the lifeworld. 
To accept that in democratic systems ‘all government is by the people’ (Habermas, 2001b, 
p. 768; cf. Ferrara, 2001) means to do justice to the fact that ‘all society is by the people’. 
From a democratic point of view, those who make up society should also be those who 
decide over the context-laden roles of both the individual and the collective aspects of their 
everyday reality. Will-formation, in the democratic sense, is not a privilege of those who 
govern society ‘from above’, through the systemic force of the state, but, rather, a right of 
those who build society ‘from below’, through the communicative force of the lifeworld. 
Hence, ‘the discourse-theoretic interpretation of the democratic self-constitution of the 
constitutional state [Verfassungsstaat]’ (Habermas, 2001b, p. 776) concerns not only the 
systemic sphere of administrative structures put in place to determine the development of 
society ‘from above’, through processes of ‘functional integration’ (see Susen, 2007, pp. 
67–68, 237), but also the ordinary sphere of communicative interactions whose linguistic 
resources are mobilised to shape the development of society ‘from below’, through processes 
of ‘social integration’ (see ibidem, pp. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 237, 258). In brief, collective will- 
formation cannot dispense with the communicative practices accomplished by human 
actors, whose quotidian performances are mediated by linguistically organised processes.26 
 
10. Democracy and constitutional law 
As elucidated above, democracy has a regulative function: democratic institutions and 
democratic practices allow for the regulation – and, thus, for the normalisation – of the 
interactions taking place between members of a given society. In the context of modern 
society, the institutional inscription of practical prescriptions into consolidated democracies 
reflects the systemic necessity to solidify interactional regularity through the consolidation 
of normative frameworks founded on constitutional legality. From a Habermasian point of 
view, the complementary connection between morality and law (see, for example, Habermas, 
1994, pp. 139–141) is entrenched in the tension-laden relationship between lifeworld and 
system,27 for the institutionalisation of legislative arrangements cannot be divorced from the 
socialisation processes of communicatively sustained engagements. If we regard ‘positive 
law as a functional complement to morality’ (Habermas, 1994, p. 140), then we locate the 
abstract superstructure of legislative imperatives in the concrete infrastructure of 
communicative practices. 
Yet, not only is there an intimate link between the rule of law and everyday intelligibility, 
but, in addition, there is an ‘internal relation between the rule of law and democracy’ 
(ibidem, p. 141). Just as regulative processes of formal legislation are anchored in 
communicative processes of informal co-operation, the long-term acceptability of the rule 






transparency, accountability and reasonability. As Habermas reminds us, ‘[l]ike morality, 
so also legitimate law protects the equal autonomy of each person: no individual is free so 
long as all persons do not enjoy an equal freedom’ (Habermas, 2001b, p. 779). Put differently, 
private and civic autonomy are complementary and mutually dependent elements of 
constitutionally legitimated democracies and democratically legitimated constitutions: 
‘[t]he interdependence of constitutionalism and democracy comes to light in this 
complementary relationship between private and civic autonomy: each side is fed by 
resources it has from the other’ (ibidem, p. 780). 
If the Dasein (being-there) of every member of humanity cannot be detached from the 
Miteinandersein (being-with-one-another) experienced by all members of society, then the 
affirmation of personal autonomy is contingent upon the assertion of civic autonomy. It is 
the function of constitutional law to ensure that individual self-government and collective 
self-government co-exist as two complementary preconditions for the attainment of political 
legitimacy within democratically organised societies.28 
 
Conclusion 
As illustrated in the previous analysis, Habermas’s concern with democracy is inseparably 
linked to his interest in language. This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that ten elements 
are particularly important to Habermas’s multifaceted account of democracy: (1) deliberation, 
(2)  reciprocity,  (3)  self-determination,  (4)  citizenship,   (5)  the  state,   (6)  sovereignty, 
(7) communicative rationality, (8) regulation, (9) will-formation and (10) constitutional law. 
From a Habermasian point of view, the construction of an emancipatory society is 
inconceivable without the sustained attempt to bring about a solid form of democracy based 
on the deliberative power that is embedded in people’s communicative capacity. Subjects 
capable of speech and action are equipped with the competence to take both individual and 
collective decisions that are derived from intersubjective processes of reflection, justification 
and deliberation. The preceding enquiry has sought to identify the principal components 
underlying Habermas’s conception of democracy. This concluding section endeavours to 
address a number of issues that arise when confronted with the task of assessing both the 
validity and the usefulness of Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of democracy. 
Following the structure of the foregoing study, these issues can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. There is no democracy without processes of deliberation. It is far from clear, however, to 
what extent direct and deliberative models of democracy are viable in large-scale societies, 
which – owing to their demographic and systemic complexity – tend to rely on indirect 
and representative forms of political participation. 
2. There is no democracy without both dynamics and structures of reciprocity. It is not 
obvious, however, to what extent asymmetrical and power-laden modes of reciprocity can 
be challenged in order to build a society in which fundamental sociological variables – 
such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability – cease to have both a determining and a 
detrimental impact upon the political agendas set under the banner of democracy. 
3. There is no democracy without the possibility of self-determination. It remains open to 
scrutiny, however, to what extent it is achievable to grant every individual or collective 
actor not only the formal right to, but also the substantive resources for, autonomy, self- 
government and self-realisation – especially in light of the fact that behavioural, ideological 







4. There is no democracy without citizenship. It is a matter of debate, however, to what extent 
it is feasible to strike a healthy balance between, on the one hand, rights and entitlements 
and, on the other hand, duties and obligations – notably in societies that are characterised 
by high levels of internal cultural diversity and, hence, by advanced degrees of behavioural, 
ideological and institutional heterogeneity. 
5. There is no democracy without a state – at least not in large-scale societies. One of the key 
issues that remain crucial in this respect, however, is the question of the extent to which it 
may be both viable and desirable to create a society whose members are capable of co- 
ordinating their actions and managing their affairs without relying on an institutional entity 
equivalent to a state or a polity. The question, then, is not simply to what degree and in 
which specific areas of social life the state should, or should not, have the right to intervene; 
more fundamentally, the question is whether or not, in the course of human history, the 
consolidation of a highly differentiated society without a polity can be considered a realistic 
possibility. 
6. There is no democracy without sovereignty. Irrespective of whether we reflect on individual 
or collective, internal or external, real or imagined forms of sovereignty, it is far from 
evident, however, to what extent, in a global network society, actors have the potential, let 
alone the factual, power to make decisions as genuinely autonomous entities. In an age of 
increasing interconnectedness, the pivotal sources of agency appear to have shifted from a 
hitherto self-empowered humanity to an assemblage of constantly changing parameters of 
performativity, with no sense of direction, let alone an underlying teleology. 
7. There is no democracy without communicative rationality. To be exact, the socio- 
ontological forces of Verstand (reason), Verständigung (communication), Verstehen 
(understanding), Verständlichkeit (intelligibility) and Einverständnis (agreement) play a 
foundational role in the construction of democracy. No less central, however, is the 
function of seemingly uncomfortable – yet, vastly influential – elements of democracy, 
such as the following: (a) not only belief and faith, but also madness and fanaticism; (b) 
not only miscommunication, but also silence and disengagement; (c) not only 
misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misconception, but also confusion, perplexity 
and bewilderment; (d) not only unintelligibility, incomprehensibility and obscurity, but 
also misrepresentation, distortion and manipulation; (e) not only disagreement, discrepancy 
and controversy, but also rupture, friction and hostility. 
8. There is no democracy without regulation. The question that poses itself in this context, 
however, is to what extent democratically controlled processes of regulation can be 
converted into oppressive mechanisms of normalisation, habitualisation and disciplination 
capable of undermining human empowerment, autonomy and self-realisation. 
9. There is no democracy without will-formation. The mere fact that, in democratic societies, 
subjects capable of speech and action are engaged in processes of opinion- and will- 
formation, however, does not reveal anything about the extent to which their views, beliefs, 
judgements and decisions are universally defensible, rather than applicable only to the 
limited horizon of context-specific modes of individual or collective agency. The 
construction of value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power- 
laden and tension-laden realities manifests itself in the emergence of normativities, 
reflecting the contestability that inhabits symbolically mediated life forms as they evolve 
throughout history. 
10. There is no democracy without constitutional law – at least not in highly differentiated 
societies. The fact that something is legal, however, does not make it legitimate. 






What is more, grass-roots democracy can dispense with the formalised rules, criteria and 
standards that are imposed ‘from above’ by constitutionally founded systems of legality. 
Genuine democracy is not simply a matter of imposing the lawfulness of procedural 
politics upon the relative arbitrariness of everyday occurrences; rather, it involves the 
challenge of ensuring that those whose lives are shaped – if not governed – by customs, 
conventions and principles are not only entitled but also empowered to negotiate – and, if 
necessary, to define – the normative parameters underlying their existence themselves. 
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